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The Statute and the Judge1
Contemporary jurisprudence is witnessing a grave crisis. It is not just that 
are there numerous disputes and profound discrepancies between the ad-
opted positions. Something else is involved. Nowadays, one casts doubt 
on the very foundations of legal knowledge, questions the most cardinal, 
established views with regard to the essence of law, statute, the state, 
punishment, and the methods and the tasks of jurisprudence. In crimi-
nology, the dispute between the classics and the sociological school con-
tinues. In legal-political sciences theories emerge which strive to com-
pletely transform the current understanding of the state and its functions 
(Duguit). Philosophy of law is beginning to shift the essence of law be-
yond the traditionally determined boundaries, into completely separate 
domains (Petrażycki). The only branch of jurisprudence which relied on 
the most sound and lasting foundations was the province of civil law. 
That earliest and most highly developed legal discipline, which became 
the methodological paradigm for the whole of jurisprudence, was char-
acterized by solid fundaments and lucidity of method, and the two out-
standing fruits of legislative activity at the turn of the nineteenth century 
(German and Swiss codes) offered new proof of the productiveness of 
pertinent scholarly work. 
1 Translated from: A. Peretiatkowicz, Prąd nowy w prawoznawstwie. Sędzia a ustawa, 
Kraków 1916 by Szymon Nowak and proofread by Stephen Dersley. The translation 
and proofreading were financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education under 
848/2/P-DUN/2018.
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In recent years, we have seen the emergence of a new trend which 
has significance for the entirety of jurisprudence and is expressed 
with particular intensity in the studies of civil law. The trend originat-
ed from Germany and France, and has spread ever more widely among 
both theorists and practitioners, and is now penetrating into circles of 
non-lawyers, becoming a topical issue. The matter in question is not 
a notion, but a method. Not a difference of views over certain debat-
able issues, but the very goal of civil law inquiry, the path which leads 
to the attainment of that goal. Hence the tremendous importance of this 
novel direction, for as methods of civil law have been applied in other 
branches of jurisprudence, so a change of these methods entails a reform 
of jurisprudence in its entirety. A matter of such general nature is no 
longer restricted to civil law alone, but is now a matter to be addressed 
by legal philosophy. Both civil lawyers and the synthetic knowledge 
of the essence and tasks of law and jurisprudence should focus on re-
solving the above issue, for only joint consideration may bring a felici-
tous solution to such a complex problem. Setting out from two distinct 
positions, they should strive for a shared objective that constitutes the 
lodestar of jurisprudence: a theoretical apprehension of the matter that 
would simultaneously respond—as well as possible—to the practical 
demands of social life. The objective of this paper is to outline this new 
trend (for the sake of convenience referred to as “modernist”), to high-
light and characterize its principal properties, and elaborate further on 
the essential premises, taking into account the crucial elements and re-
quirements of law as such. 
One of the theoretical underpinnings of the modern state system 
is found in the teachings of Montesquieu regarding the separation of 
power. Admittedly, it has not been consistently and fully implemented, 
but the principle of making judicial power independent of the legislative 
and the executive branches currently provides the core factor in the or-
ganization of state authority. “The political liberty of the subject,” Mon-
tesquieu says, “is a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each 
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person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the 
government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another. 
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same per-
son, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because 
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact 
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is 
no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative 
and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of 
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would 
be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge 
might behave with violence and oppression.”2 In consequence, Mon-
tesquieu assigns judges a role which is utterly passive. They are only 
required to know the statutes and implement its provisions. Each adju-
dication is to strictly reflect a statute. Were it to evince the private opin-
ion of the judge, one would live in a society without being aware one’s 
obligations. It is therefore important to make the words of statutes evoke 
the same thought in all people. “The national judges are no more than 
the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, 
incapable of moderating either its force or rigour.”3 The lawyer in the 
judge’s chair becomes a machine, a subsuming apparatus which match-
es life’s vicissitudes to pertinent, existing provisions. 
The above conception is characteristic of the rational thought of the 
Enlightenment, which looked with great scepticism upon human nature, 
discerning only egoistic and negative elements within. In order to pro-
tect society against the licence of judges, one should make the activities 
of the latter independent of their character, bring the mental compo-
nent (which is decisive for rationalism) to the fore, and base everything 
on the intellect guided by the statute. This was endorsed by the cult of 
laws that typified those times, which found its expression in the French 
constitutions and Napoleon’s codifications. In statutes (created by the 
2 C.L. Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, Londres 1777.
3 Ibidem.
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members of society themselves) many saw the political salvation of the 
humankind, a cure to all kinds of social ills. In the then intellectual cli-
mate, the position expounded by Montesquieu and his understanding of 
the tasks of a judge was, at least in principle, universally recognized and 
adopted. 
The historical school contributed to the dethronement of statutes 
from the pedestal to which they had been elevated by the eighteenth cen-
tury, and indicated new ways that jurisprudence should follow. Although 
legislative activity was not halted, the most brilliant legal minds took 
a historical direction, chiefly turning to studies of Roman law (Winds-
cheid, Dernburg, Ihering). That is as far as theory was concerned. What 
about practice? Little changed in that respect.4 The historical school also 
gave the judge a passive role, acknowledging in principle that the task of 
the judge is to examine the intentions of the legislator. Given that a stat-
ute is only an expression of the national spirit, then it can only be duly 
comprehended when considering the legal past of the nation in question. 
Hence the significance of history of the law which preceded a particu-
lar statute and the importance of customary law. Essentially, however, 
Montesquieu’s position underwent no change. A judge is expected to 
seek a solution beyond themselves, and to extract the appropriate norm 
from the statute in force (or, alternatively, from customary law). 
That the provisions contained in statutes are binding on judges in ab-
solute terms has been, and most likely shall remain, a certainty beyond 
any doubt for lawyers.5 A question nevertheless arises, namely what 
should be done in cases involving situations for which a statute does not 
provide. The legislator is not capable of regulating all the events that 
may take place in future, might not know the technological and eco-
4 Bülow offers some highly interesting remarks on the approach of practitioners of the historical 
school. O. Bülow Heitere und ernste Betrachtungen über die Rechtwissenschaft, Leipzig 1901.
5 Though not without exceptions. Former natural law did not recognize that principle. Opin-
ions to the contrary, albeit few, are heard today as well. “Die Funktion des freien Rechts 
äussert sich als die Ausserkraftstellung des Gesetzesrechts in Ausnahmefällen.” F. Berol-
zheimer, Die Gefahren einer Gefühlsjurisprudenz, paper delivered at the legal-philosophi-
cal congress in June 1911. 
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nomic circumstances, or the cultural and social situations that will arise 
in the subsequent years and centuries. Therefore, there is a tremendous 
number of issues (the older the statute, the more numerous they are) re-
garding which no intention has been expressed by the legislator. We are 
then faced with loopholes in the law. 
However, concluding that lacunae are in evidence is admissible only 
from the dogmatic standpoint, in view of the sources of law which the 
judge draws upon when adjudicating a case. From the legal-political 
perspective, an applicable statute must not be wanting, considering 
the organization of the judiciary. After all, a judge cannot refuse to issue 
a verdict. Article 4 of the French code states: “The judge who refuses to 
judge under the pretext that law is silent, obscure or insufficient, shall be 
prosecuted as guilty of denial of justice.” 
We thus arrive at an internal contradiction, a logical collision. The im-
perative of adjudicating each dispute, issuing a verdict solely on the basis 
of a statute and the unavoidable imperfection of each statute: those three 
things cannot be reconciled. Given that consistency is a fundamental pos-
tulate of jurisprudence and a prerequisite of its existence as a science, it is 
necessary to find a way out of the predicament. 
The traditional method found a solution based on the fiction of statu-
tory perfection (absence of gaps, completeness of the legal system). Fol-
lowing Montesquieu, it held that the “will of the legislator” is the only 
authoritative and decisive factor for the judge and the theoretical law-
yer. If it is not found in the statute in an explicit form, then one should 
search for a “conjecturable will” which also arises from the statute. The 
traditional method negates the existence of lacunae in the statute, which 
represents a rounded whole, regulating a particular sphere of life ex-
haustively. Properly understood and accurately interpreted, a statute 
provides all the legal solutions one requires. Using various interpre-
tive measures (extensio, restrictio, analogy based on ratio iuris, argu-
mentum a contrario, a majori ad minus, a majori ad maius, examination 
of preliminary material etc.) one can always discover the correct inten-
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tion behind the statute, even though it has not been stated in explicit 
terms. The subtle mind of the lawyer should weave the entire intricate 
logical fabric, providing for all events and circumstances, as well as reg-
ulating human contentions. By way of syllogisms and abstract concep-
tualization, the lawyer creates a complete, exhaustive system of applica-
ble norms, which offers answers to all the issues occurring in practical life. 
That tendency was most vividly accentuated in Bergbohm6, who be-
lieved that acknowledging legal gaps is inadmissible, for in that case judg-
es would themselves become a source of law. Law does not need to be 
supplemented from the outside, being at any given point comprehensive 
and complete thanks to its inner prolificacy; thanks to the capacity for 
“logical expansion” which satisfies all juridical needs. “This is no fiction, 
but an incontrovertible fact”.7 Statues are not law, they merely indicate 
legal thoughts which a theoretician should elaborate, complement, and 
create a rounded legal system. If they are incapable of achieving that, 
it only attests to gaps in their intellect, but not in the legal system, which 
at all times remains a harmonious whole. If so-called gaps in the statute 
do exist, then they have to be filled through the “logical expansion” of the 
existing norms. 
There has been some very lively opposition recently against the 
direction in jurisprudence which relies exclusively on statutes, logical 
paradigms and conclusions. Ihering may be considered the spiritual 
father and the first representative of the modernist current; initially, 
he subscribed to the traditional method, and it was only later that he 
spoke against it very forcefully and, given the times, very radically. Al-
ready in the third part of his Geist des roemischen Rechts there is a chap-
ter devoted to the overestimation of the logical element in law. To Iher-
ing, that cult of logic which seeks to make jurisprudence a kind of legal 
mathematics fails to understand the true essence of law and loses it from 
sight. It is not life that exists for notions, but notions for life. These are 
6 C. Bergbohm, Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie, Leipzig 1892, pp. 372–393.
7 Ibidem, p. 388.
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not the demands of logic which must be reified, but postulations of life, 
transaction, and legal sense, irrespective of whether they appear logical 
or impossible. In the satirical-serious work entitled Scherz und Ernst 
in der Jurisprudenz (1884), the author strives to demonstrate—both 
through irony and in serious articulation—the consequences of the dom-
inant juridical doctrine he calls “Begriffsjurisprudenz” (the designation 
has become widespread and now constitutes a negative catchword used 
to signify the modernist trend). Whereas Roman lawyers followed the 
path of consequence only as far as the boundary imposed by practical 
needs, and while employing their legal logic always kept life itself in 
mind, contemporary jurisprudence is unaware of such considerations 
and not infrequently arrives at a result which is thoroughly at odds with 
the very aim of law. Therefore, in the opening, programmatic article of 
the journal he published8, Ihering formulates the rallying call “Durch 
das römische Recht über das römische Recht hinaus”. This essential 
idea of the goal in any law, to which Ihering devoted his last, unfinished 
work, became the chief positive motto of the modernist trend. 
One of the earliest and the most vehement opponents of the histori-
cal school and the omnipotence of the statute was Professor O. Bülow 
who, in numerous papers and above all in the treatise Gesetz und Rich-
teramt (1885), drew attention to the actual significance of the judicial 
profession. Highlighting the role of judges in the historical develop-
ment of law, the principle of the binding power of the ruling even when 
it contradicted a statute, and the utter impotence of legislation were it 
deprived of the judicial organization, he demonstrated that the position 
of the judges in the legal system of any society is by no means pas-
sive and receptive. In 1891, in his brilliant rectorial address concerning 
Werturteile und Willensentscheidungen, Rümelin argued that an element 
of subjective evaluation inevitably accompanies judges’ actions, by vir-
tue of which the latter are creative rather than intellectual-mechanistic 
8 R. von Jhering, Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Priva-
trechts, Jena 1857.
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in their nature, as the application of various interpretive measures is 
always founded on judgments regarding their value. 
However, the above views failed to resonate to any great extent 
among contemporary lawyers, imbued as they were with the influences 
of the historical school. It was only very recently that a keener interest in 
legal-philosophical and methodological issues has been reawakened. 
In Germany, considerable credit in that respect is due to the works by 
Kohler and Stammler. The latter in particular, although not a modern-
ist in formal terms, contributed to the development of the new current. 
Stammler’s philosophy tends to be comprehended and assessed in vary-
ing ways. Nonetheless, his concept of “das richtige Recht” has spread 
very widely in Germany, leading to the recognition of the need for the 
“the right law.” 
A veritable watershed in the development of the modernist trend 
came with the splendid work of the French professor, Gény (a pupil of 
Saleilles’s, one of the first representatives and propagators of the new 
current in France), entitled Metode d’interpretation et sources en droit 
prive positif (1899): a kind of gospel of the new trend in France. Based 
on a tremendous volume of both theoretical and practical material 
sourced from French courts, Gény demonstrated the possibility and ne-
cessity of reforming the methods of jurisprudence in the spirit of modern 
requirements. With formidable competence and circumspection, and ,at 
the same time, a keenly critical and boldly creative approach, the author 
advocates abandoning the fiction of the “legislative will”, which does 
not correspond to facts, and acknowledging the undeniable existence 
of legal loopholes, which are to be remedied by liberal research into 
today’s social needs (libre recherche scientifique du droit). Relying on 
the entirety of modern knowledge that takes the social and technologi-
cal achievement of the human spirit into account, one should look for 
a norm which would constitute a vital (natural) law that tallies with the 
demands of our times. To oppose the former position, Gény advances 
a new motto: “Par le Code, mais au dela du Code!”
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One of the most tenacious champions of these novel ideas is profes-
sor Ehrlich, whose pamphlet Freie Rechtsfindung und freie Rechtswissen-
schaft (1903) gained considerable renown and became one of the ideo-
logical foundations of the modernist movement in Germany. Ehrlich finds 
the contemporary cult of the statute to be intrinsic to the bureaucratic 
state (Beamtenstaat) and believes that one should return to historical tra-
ditions (Roman, medieval, or those from the Renaissance period), when 
the authority and the significance of the judge carried much more weight. 
The new trend aspires to put forward outstanding individuals, who would 
contribute to the development of law and increase its influence among 
broad social strata. 
Jurisprudence should guide judges along the correct course as they 
face contemporary issues; it should also examine law in its actual social 
manifestations. The concern should not lie solely with the wording of 
a regulation but with how it functions in life, with whether and how it is 
applied. The year 1906 saw the publication of an anonymous pamphlet: 
Gnaeus Flavius Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft (written by Prof. 
Kantorowicz from Fribourg, as it later transpired), which thanks to clari-
ty of disquisition, eloquent terms, and the fervour of the author did much 
to popularize the new ideas, at least among theoreticians. At the same 
time, it gave name to the entire movement (freirechtliche Bewegung) 
which was almost universally adopted in Germany. A considerable im-
pact, particularly on German practitioners, was exerted by the writings 
of the advocate E. Fuchs (Recht und Wahrheit in unserer heutigen Justiz, 
1908, Die Gemeinschädlichkeit der konstruktiven Jurisprudenz, 1909, 
and other works), who admittedly goes too far at times, but in general 
very aptly—based on extensive practical material—highlights the short-
comings of the method which holds sway today. As a theoretical-politi-
cal manifestation of the free-law movement in jurisprudence, the Swiss 
code (which came into force in 1912) is particularly worthy of mention, 
as its first article sets forth: “Das Gesetz findet auf alle Rechtsfragen 
Anwendung, für die es nach Wortlaut oder Auslegung eine Bestimmung 
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enthalt. Kann dem Gesetze keine Vorschrift entnommen werden, so 
soll der Richter nach Gewohnheitsrecht und wo auch ein solches fehlt, 
nach der Regel entscheiden, die er als Gesetzgeber aufstellen würde. Er 
folgt dabei bewahrter Lehre und Überlieferung.”
I have mentioned the most important works which in a sense repre-
sent stages in the development of the new trend, in view of their influ-
ence in various milieus.9 The final phase of the modernist movement 
assumed a practical dimension and reached very broad circles, well 
beyond the domain of the legal profession. In early 1911, two appeals 
were circulated, whose authors called for a reform of jurisprudence and 
the judicature; this resulted in the formation of two groups of modern-
ists. The first of these was led by Bozi10 (a judge in Bielefeld), who 
also gathered numerous non-lawyers around him; the second was es-
tablished by Börngen (president of the higher regional court in Jena). In 
March, both factions united by incorporating as the association Recht 
und Wirtschaft, whose adopted motto stated: “Forderung zeitgemäss-
er Rechtspflege und Verwaltung.” Since autumn 1911, the association 
published its own periodical in order to kindle interest in the issues in 
question among the broader public. The matter of the judge’s approach 
to statutes was included in the agenda of the forthcoming congress of 
German judges, and it is to be expected that it will be resolved in a spirit 
which favours modernism. One could even say that legal modernism 
has all too many adherents, that it gained recognition too quickly, that 
the presence of outstanding opponents would enable the new trend to be 
expounded better and to become more profound.11 
9 One of the eminent modernists is Prof. Zoll Junior, whose noteworthy works in this respect 
are little known in the West due to reasons of language. 
10 The author of numerous treaties particularly Die Weltanschauung der Jurisprudenz, 
in which he argues that jurisprudence be made an experimental science, based on founda-
tions derived from natural sciences. A. Bozi, Die Weltanschauung der Jurisprudenz, Han-
nover-Helwing 1911. 
11 Modernism has an outspoken and ingenious adversary in Prof. Donati (D. Donati, Il prob-
lema delle lacune dell ordinamento giuridico, Milan 1910), who resumes Zitelmann’s ar-
guments (E. Zitelmann, A. Pestalozza Lücken im Recht, Bonn 1903), and elaborates them 
further. Donati holds that by linking legal effects with certain states of fact, the legal order 
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We are thus confronted with a trend which is very broad and exceed-
ingly influential with respect to methodology. At the moment, following 
wider practical propaganda, it has crystallized into a more distinct form 
and may be deemed a coherent whole. Let us then conduct a concise, 
legal-philosophical analysis of that new trend, consider the causes be-
hind the emergence of the movement, its chief attributes and its out-
comes—which can and should be pursued. Finally, let us delve into that 
aspect of the new current which may have a special significance for us, 
Poles. The scope of this paper does not allow the above to be discussed 
exhaustively, which is why I will confine myself to the essential ideas 
and the most important observations. 
It would be a futile and unproductive endeavour to determine con-
clusively the actual source of the new turn in legal thought. The scien-
tific and social currents are too complex and comprise too many ele-
ments to be considered the outcome of one single cause. One should 
not even speak of a causal relationship in the strict sense. After all, the 
relationship presupposes absolute necessity for a given effect to ensue if 
facts which constitute its cause have occurred. Contemporary psychol-
ogy has failed to determine the causes which inevitably engender partic-
ular human thoughts, therefore when studying intellectual currents one 
can only speak of factors whose collusion accompanied the emergence 
of those currents, but we should be aware of the psychological impos-
sibility of arriving at an accurate delineation of the entirety of such fac-
tors. In this instance as well, when trying to establish the origins of legal 
modernism, we may only distinguish the principal types those factors 
which, as it is usually the case with scientific-social currents, include 
intellectual considerations on the one hand, and factual elements on the 
other; theory one the one hand, whereas on the other—life itself. 
The theoretical aspects are associated with the orientation of human 
thought which ever more strongly embraces contemporary philosophy 
excludes the latter with respect to all other possible states. Thus, he recognized the “force 
of logical exclusion” as opposed to “force of logical expansion.” 
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and presents itself under the name of voluntarism. The intellectual-
ism and rationalism of the Enlightenment triggered a reactionary re-
sponse in the form of the psychology of emotion, which is not so much 
a particular trend in psychology as a general spiritual current, encom-
passing philosophy, literature, art, etc. That general philosophical atmo-
sphere was also manifested in the emergence of the historical school, 
which bore the mark of Romanticism. By way of counterpoise to delib-
erate, intellectual creation, it attached primary importance to the process 
of the unconscious formation of law, and display cult-like reverence for 
folk elements, vital factors which actually operated in life. However, the 
emotional bias in psychology did not last long, and in more recent times 
we have seen a distinct tendency for will rather than intellect and emotion 
to come to the fore. Admittedly, voluntarism does not aspire to account 
for all inner experience by invoking the elements of will, as intellectual-
ism had one-sidedly done with notions and ideas. Still, it considers that 
factor to be more consequential and presumes that it plays a role both 
in emotional and intellectual processes. A complete isolation of the in-
tellectual elements may prove helpful in a more thorough analysis and 
facilitate better understanding of respective phenomena, but this process 
is artificial, methodical, and so does not amount to actual psychologi-
cal phenomenon. The threads of inner experience are a homogeneous 
whole which can only be divided through abstraction, but in reality they 
constitute inseparable parts of a single mental entity, in which the ele-
ments of will are those of primary importance. “Other elements,” Wundt 
observes, “are always components of the complete process of will and 
cannot be contradicted with will in a manner resembling the way in 
which the latter can be separated from notions from the standpoint of 
psychological analysis.”12 According to Sigwart, “will has an advantage 
in the theoretical domain as well.”13 “All thought,” says Windelband, 
“remains without exception under the influence of will throughout its 
12 W. Wundt, Logik der Geisteswissenschaften, Stuttgart 1908, p. 160.
13 S. Sigwart, Logik, Freiburg 1889, p. 25.
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course.”14 The most extreme expression of this approach is pragmatism 
(James, Schiller, Jerusalem), which aspires to subject our judgments 
to the criterion of public interest, and the achievement of certain life’s 
goals. This current attracts increasing numbers of adherents and begins 
to exert an influence on the whole of contemporary science. 
It was not only philosophical thought which drew lawyers’ atten-
tion to facts that made up the substrate, the fundamental premise of the 
new trend. It would be misguided to attribute a dominant role in the de-
velopment of jurisprudence to philosophy. As we know, philosophical 
knowledge does not enjoy great regard among lawyers and even such 
an outstanding intellectual as Ihering appreciated its significance only 
towards the end of his life, and publicly deplored deficiencies in that 
respect. Still, facts and practical life appeal keenly to lawyers and their 
impact is much more forceful. The past century and recent years have 
provided plenty of such facts. Social life has probably never been as dy-
namic as in that period. The extensive achievements in technology, and 
the changing economic and cultural circumstances, generate ever new 
social needs and demands in the legal domain. It becomes evident that 
statutes fail to keep up with life. Each law is by nature conservative, and 
it is already obsolete when it is drafted, encapsulating the phenomena 
and factors operating at the moment of its creation into a permanent 
norm. However, it is not capable of predicting future facts and changes, 
nor can it be in line with new relationships. Montesquieu realized this, 
and therefore advised the frequent revision of laws, so that all issues 
which might arise could be resolved by statutes. Here, life proved theory 
false. It demonstrated technical obstacles and the practical impossibility 
of continual legal reform. Creation of the universal German code was 
vivid proof that very long and laborious paths lead to statutes which 
cover more comprehensive domains of social life. It is clear that this 
measure will not attain its goal and counting on the legislative apparatus 
14 W. Windelband, Präludien, Aufsätze und Reden zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, Freiburg 
1884, p. 265.
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alone would be ineffective. One should look for another factor which 
could mediate between a law and the new demands posed by life, and 
this function is now discharged in practice (not in theory) by the judicial 
estate. 
On the other hand, the chasm between society and professional 
lawyers has become increasingly palpable. In the Roman times, in the 
Middle Ages and in the Renaissance the nation and the law were close; 
while the bond has been very much preserved in England, Central Eu-
rope witnessed the contrary: the absolute—and subsequently the consti-
tutional—state transformed law into a system of abstract norms which 
were unknown to the public and served officials who enforced the orders 
of the omnipotent legislator. Although the historical school maintained 
that law is a product of the national spirit while lawyers are exponents 
of the soul of nation, the law was in fact shaped after the Roman model 
without regard for the distinct nature of the matter subjected to regula-
tion. Apart from that, the historical school caused theory to be detached 
from practice, separated science from the actual administration of jus-
tice. Nineteenth-century German jurisprudence showed little interest in 
the regulations in force and readily concerned itself with the past, with 
Roman and Old Germanic times, while a similar approach pervaded the 
system of university studies. History was studied for its own sake, it was 
treated as a goal, not a means to an end. This had to change as the new 
code was introduced. A fair number of eminent figures diverted their at-
tention and efforts from history to focus on the law in force, on the pres-
ent day. The dissonance between science and practice gradually dimin-
ishes, giving rise to fitting demands placed on legal knowledge which 
formerly received so little attention. 
Finally, in countries where exhaustive codification took place at 
an early stage, such as France or Austria, experience has shown that 
the existence of comprehensive laws does not suffice to ensure the sta-
ble and uniform administration of justice. Montesquieu’s ideal, where 
“one judges today, as they will judge tomorrow, and judgments ought to 
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be fixed to such a degree as to be ever conformable to the letter of the 
law”15, was not realized, as it proved impracticable. Both with respect 
to minor affairs and matters of utmost importance, numerous theories 
were advanced, which on the grounds of the same state of facts arrived 
at divergent legal effects. The relative nature of interpretation of the 
regulations in force became ever more apparent. The history of the ap-
plication of law demonstrates a gradual evolution, which corresponds 
to the development of life and its needs. The German code also contrib-
uted to exposing the limits of the legislature and disproving the legend 
of the “logische Geschlossenheit des Rechts” much more effectively 
than the numerous and dispersed sources of Roman law could have done. 
All these factors, as well as many others, caused a breach in the 
traditional notions, engendered a kind of scepticism towards the alleged 
objectivity of law, and spurred a critical movement where the tasks 
and the methods of jurisprudence were concerned. The need for a revi-
sion of the foundations on which one had relied so far began to be per-
ceived and acknowledged. The postulation, advanced at first by a few 
profound minds, aroused increasingly lively interest, and eventually 
transformed into a universal trend which has spread across broad circles 
of theoreticians and practitioners, becoming a topical issue. It is quite 
understandable that the modernist trend, as all novel movements, does 
not have such distinct foundations and clear-cut contours as the long-
standing schools; that there are many extremes there, many ostensible 
contradictions, many groundless illusions. Let us then use the abundant 
literature to try and isolate the essential core, the enduring kernel inher-
ent in all—or at least the most modernist—views which have been ex-
pressed and possess decisive significance for the entire current. 
There are four crucial moments of the modernist movement, or ele-
ments of fundamental importance, which provide basis for all its other 
manifestations: 1) the critical-conceding moment, 2) the teleological-
15 C.L. Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, Londres 1777, XI-6.
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social moment, 3) the cult of individualism, 4) the idea of natural law 
(reformed). 
The modernist current sets out from the recognition of the vital na-
ture of jurisprudence and adjudication.16 “The fight,” states Kantorowicz, 
one of the chief representatives of modernism, “has a declarative rather 
than constitutive significance.”17 One should relinquish the illusion that 
a law, even the most comprehensive one, is able to provide for all the 
instances in which it should be applied. Civil codes endure for centu-
ries, while life changes continually, technological and economic circum-
stances shift, and it is obvious that no legislator is capable of anticipat-
ing future forms that social life may assume. Could Napoleon’s code 
have predicted the use of electricity and all the relations it would bring 
about? Could it have made allowances for the development of factory-
based production and modern means of transportation? Even if social 
conditions were to remain unchanged, no legislator is so brilliant as to 
envision absolutely all relationships, all conflicts, and all legal needs. 
Life is always more profuse and more multifaceted that statutes and 
brings forth instances to which we can find no answer. The existence of 
gaps in law is a doubtless fact. 
According to the traditional school, in such cases one should search 
for a “presumable legislative will” and fill the apparent gap by means of 
“logical expansion.” The device which serves to do so consists of well-
known interpretation methods, which are expected to extract the correct 
legislative will from the law. One of the chief assertions of modernism is 
that the “presumable will” is a fiction which should be ousted from sci-
ence, since it creates the illusion of objectivity that does not exist in real-
ity. After all, it is simply not possible to determine the notions entertained 
by the legislator from a century ago. Looking for the fictitious will, the 
commentators actually strive to find a “rational”, most “purposeful” will. 
16 The modernist movement is primarily concerned with the activities of judges; however, 
given that scholarly jurisprudence consists largely in conducting preparatory work for the 
judge, both remain closely linked. 
17 H. Kantorowicz, Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft, Heidelberg 1906, p. 9.
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Thus they introduce a new moment into their deliberations, a naturally 
subjective component of rationality and purpose. Hence adjudication in 
doubtful cases usually includes expression of views regarding the “value” 
of one decision or another, being always a “Werturteil” (to use Rümelin’s 
language), and conclusions founded on “will”. 
The use of interpretive means in order to ascertain the legislative 
will appears to be a scientifically-objective process. However, this is 
a misconception, for there are no objective criteria as to the choice of 
such means. There are numerous methods of construction, but when 
does one use analogy and when should it be argumentum a contrario? 
When should the interpretation be broadening and when restric-
tive? What should one do when a conflict of laws arises? Which norm 
should be deemed to prevail? The “rationality” and “equity” of the ob-
tained results come into play when making the choice, and thus we are 
dealing yet again with the subjective element, with “value judgments” 
and decisions based on “will.” 
Finally, one should realize that all statutes operate by employing 
notions and necessarily have to do so. Indeed, a notion is an intellectual 
instrument that is indispensable in order to find one’s bearings in the 
tremendous complexity of diverse phenomena, yet it is a very inaccu-
rate and imperfect tool.18 The substance of notions (abstract ones in par-
ticular) is virtually never delineated with such precision that it does not 
raise any doubt. Apart from the permanent elements inherent to each 
notion, there is a range of borderline points, phenomena situated at the 
outer limits of notions which constitute a transitional juncture and can 
therefore be classified in either category. A question arises here, namely 
what is the judge guided by as they subsume life’s phenomena under 
this or that legal notion? Undoubtedly other factors (rightness, purpose-
fulness) must be involved, not statutory provisions alone. Here, “value 
judgments” and decisions based on “will” are in evidence as well. 
18 Petrażycki provides some highly valuable observations in this respect. L. Petrażycki, Wstęp 
do nauki prawa i moralności, Petersburg 1907.
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Consequently, legal modernism sets out from the assumption that 
jurisprudence and judgments possess certain properties which consist 
in the inability to eliminate the subjective element, the value compo-
nent and the resulting will. Each issue of contention becomes a singu-
lar legal problem, for which there is no ready-made solution in stat-
utes, but which has to be created. Fictions that are considered a real-
ity are detrimental to science and life alike. One should critically and 
openly face the truth and refrain from concealing indisputable facts. 
Therefore, legal modernism is first and foremost critical-conceding in 
its approach. 
The second trait of the new trend is its social nature, which is why 
it adopts the creed of “Die sociale Jurisprudenz” as its modern postula-
tion instead of the traditional “Begriffsjurisprudenz” (as construed by 
Ihering, where it means the creation of abstract notions without tak-
ing into consideration the consequences it may lead to, compounded 
by their application to resolve legal questions regardless of the useful-
ness of the results thus obtained). Modernism emphasizes the principle 
of the purpose of each law, which is only a means of satisfying social 
needs. In view of the fact that legislation contains numerous loopholes, 
contradictions and inaccuracies, it should be implemented from the te-
leological standpoint, i.e. its rightness and social interest. A statute is not 
an end in itself and the logical perfection of the system is not the goal 
of jurisprudence. If the judge fails to find a clearly formulated provision 
in a statute, then they should be at complete liberty to look for the most 
pertinent norm. Freie Rechtsfindung! Libre recherche scientifique! It is 
not through abstraction and logical analysis, not by way of intricate con-
structions that the judge should arrive at the right decision, but through 
thorough knowledge of social life and its needs. Universal benefit and 
justice should be their directives. Thus the activity of the judge becomes 
analogous to legislative action, with the exception that the decision of 
the judge does not produce a general but a specific norm pertaining to 
the case it regulates. Given such broadly understood tasks of the judge, 
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the duty to fulfil them adequately becomes a difficult one indeed. The 
judge cannot limit themselves to in-depth knowledge of laws and rel-
evant literature, as they need to reach beyond the confines of their office 
and approach life itself. Only thorough knowledge of social relation-
ships, scrupulous examination of the facts and data make a right ver-
dict possible. It is indispensable to be conversant with the factors which 
yield modern culture, meaning the knowledge of both the actual political 
system which provides the framework for all institutions and expresses 
itself in laws and customs, the structure of contemporary economy, as 
well as moral and religious concepts which function within a society 
and require being taken into account. In this respect, they may avail 
themselves of the contemporary achievements of the human spirit and 
the findings of modern scientific inquiry. The lawyer should also know 
the yield of economics, ethics and philosophy, psychology as well as 
take advantage of technological sciences, so as to have a clear idea of 
the shape of contemporary civilization and its demands. Sociology is 
of paramount importance here, a science encompassing the entirety of 
social life which admittedly has not yet gained stable foundations and 
a sure method, but one of which much may be expected in the future. 
As Gény asserts, “one should set much less store by logic, in itself ut-
terly fruitless if one does not combine it with real material, and turn 
to sciences and methods which aspire to discover the active and fer-
tile substance by observing, analyzing, and elucidating the entire social 
life of humankind.” The element of interest, elaborated by Ihering, is 
very strongly underscored by many modernists. Resolving contentious 
issues presupposes understanding of the interests involved and striv-
ing to bring them into balance from the standpoint of the social good. 
This means granting state sanction to those interests which carry higher 
importance. Determination of individual rights can be best facilitated 
by an examination of the overall economic and social goals, and the 
subsequent comparison of their significance with the weight of interests 
that are contrary to those goals. Various teleological moments are given 
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consideration in practice even today, but this usually assumes the form 
of a constructive dialectic and is thus hampered and distorted. 
Modernists demand that social factors in the above sense are also 
introduced in the course of university studies. They argue against one-
sided historicism and the “jurisprudence of notions”, insisting that pres-
ent-day social relationships should be incorporated to a greater extent. 
One should look not only outside oneself, but also ahead of oneself and 
into the future. One should tend to the harmony of the system and con-
sistency of legal constructs as well as their capacity to satisfy existing 
social needs. Alongside the knowledge of laws, the young lawyer should 
learn to understand people and social life. Psychology, political econ-
omy, sociology and their applications should be an inseparable part of 
legal studies. This is echoed in the demand which Ehrlich is particularly 
vociferous about, namely to study legal norms not only in their abstract, 
theoretical form, but also in real life. “A legal norm is not a rigid dogma, 
but a vital force.” The task of jurisprudence is to present law as it actual-
ly applies and operates. One who only knows the “will of the legislator” 
does not know law which exists in fact. According to Ehrlich, dogmatic 
understanding should be contrasted with dynamic understanding, which 
considers law as it operates in practice. 
Social nature is also manifested in the postulation calling for the 
democratization of law, in order to bridge the distance between law and 
the wider masses. One the one hand, law should be given a form which 
is accessible and comprehensible to all strata, while on the other its sub-
stance should be indicative of society’s legal awareness and thus nur-
ture a close bond with the people. Current jurisprudence has turned out 
a class of spiritual aristocrats, a separate caste who are not understood 
by the general public and who do not understand the latter either. One 
should strive for the state which had once existed in Rome. The confi-
dence in law and the cult of law may only ensue if there is knowledge of 
it. Here, the demand for “Die sociale Jurisprudenz” in lieu of “Begriffs-
jurisprudenz” applies as well. 
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The third essential moment in legal modernism, perhaps not as defi-
nite as the previous ones but still recurring in various forms, is the con-
viction presuming the existence of non-positive law, a law which exists 
outside statutes and which should be valid for the judge when rectify-
ing statutory loopholes. “The new understanding of law”, Kantorowicz 
says, “presents itself as a revival of the natural law in an altered form.”19 
A curious twist of history! Repressed by the historical school, by the 
empiricism of the nineteenth century, by modern positivism, natural law 
seemed to have withdrawn from the realm of law and found shelter in 
the archives of the past. Towards the end of the last century, Bergbohm 
dedicated much of his life to the labour—fruitless, as it turned out—of 
searching for and detecting the remnants of that utopia hidden in various 
forms, so as to extirpate it from legal science once and for all. Meanwhile, 
today we see that doomed idea resurface with great vigour. Also, if we 
look back at history and realize that the idea of natural law never really 
disappeared, that in society, outside the sphere of professional lawyers, 
the idea still lives and operates, it would be legitimate to ask whether it 
is not a sociological fact, a social-psychological phenomenon which not 
only manifests itself in diverse form but is—in its essence—inseparably 
linked to human nature. However, we are not going to delve into that 
question here as it would lead us too far; let us only state that legal mod-
ernists constantly invoke non-positive law. The difference between its 
modern and past variants is easy to capture. It is not considered perma-
nent, immutable, independent from the circumstances of time and place; 
on the contrary, it is believed to depend on economic, social and po-
litical relationships, on the level of civilizational advancement, on the 
culture of the given period. It does not possess binding force (as the old 
school maintained) on a par with or even above statutes, having merely 
certain ancillary significance as it fills statutory loopholes. 
Determination of the positive character and positive substance of the 
modern natural law is less lucid, which is quite understandable consid-
19 H. Kantorowicz, Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft, Heidelberg 1906, p. 10.
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ering the difficulties and complexities involved. Prof. Gény—who inci-
dentally combines natural law with the principle of justice—goes far-
ther than anyone else in this matter. He assumes the existence of certain 
ethical factors which endure unchanged over time. “Beyond and above 
the positive nature of things, composed of material and mutable ele-
ments, there exists a higher order of things which consists of changeless 
principles of reason and ethical factors.”20 The statute is only one of the 
expressions of the essential law, which can and should fulfil its role out-
side the statute. Kantorowicz recognizes the existence of a law “which 
aspires to binding force irrespective of state power” and calls it “freies 
Recht”. The matter is expounded in most explicit terms by Prof. Zoll, 
who sees “the right law” in “the principles and rules which at a given 
moment should, in view of the ‘nature of things’, be deemed as the best 
and the most appropriate ones, as an ideal of legal norms”, while as-
serting that “at a given moment and in a given society there can be only 
one just law.”21 It becomes the source of the applicable law by virtue of 
interpretation which should make use of it. 
The very motto of the new trend, that is “Freie Rechtsfindung!”, in-
trinsically presumes the existence of law outside the statute, one which 
needs to be found. Strictly speaking, one should rather speak of the “cre-
ation of law” in this case, and then “Freie Rechtsschöpfung!”22 would 
be a more fitting slogan. 
The fourth fundamental moment of the modernist trend is a certain cult 
of individualism in the actions of the judge. In this respect, the new current 
represents a complete contrast to the age of Montesquieu, when efforts 
were made to extinguish any traits of individuality in the mind of the 
judge, and organize the judiciary in such a way that the judge would be 
a machine, an intermediary apparatus between statutes and the adminis-
20 F. Gény, Méthode d’interprétation et sources en droit privé positif: essai critique, Paris 
1899, p. 481.
21 F. Zoll, Austriackie prawo prywatne. Część ogólna, Kraków 1909, p. 28.
22 See the valuable remarks made by Prof. Radbruch in Rechtswissenschaft als Rechtsschöp-
fung. G. Radbruch, Rechtswissenschaft als Rechtsschöpfung, Heidelberg 1906.
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tration of justice. Modernists repeatedly invoke the example of England 
and the importance that eminent judges enjoy in that country.23 They call 
for fewer but better selected judges, assuming that outstanding person-
alities will contribute more effectively to the development of law than 
average minds. Just as natural law in its time set the inalienable rights 
of a person against the state, so legal modernism juxtaposes the rigidity 
and formalism of state norms against the discretion of judges, who may 
treat each case differently, employ an individualized approach instead of 
a single, uniform standard. Modernism realizes that such treatment entails 
subjectivity and certain latitude, yet it believes that this will yield better 
results than the inflexibility of statutes and template-like adjudication, in 
which subjectivity cannot be completely eliminated either. Still, there is 
no doubt that this individualistic bias is associated with confidence in the 
present-day representatives of the judicial estate. 
Besides those fundamental elements, encountered in almost all 
modernist treatises and uniting the adherents of the new trend into one, 
tightly-knit camp, there are many other postulations and views which 
divide the movement into internal factions. Thus, claims are made de 
lege ferenda: to extend the liberties of the judge by virtue of statutes 
themselves, to create laws in the form of general guidelines rather than 
detailed regulations, to launch procedural reform oriented towards the 
elimination of superfluous formalities, a reform of the judicial admin-
istration etc. Furthermore, some demand nationalization of the legal 
language, which should be made comprehensible to the broad public, 
ensuring older lawyers-practitioners an opportunity of further educa-
tion, or elevating the social status of the judges. However, as the move-
ment evolves, the fundamental critical-methodological elements come 
to the fore and gather increasing numbers of supporters, which promotes 
greater clarity and perspicuity. 
23 Prof. Gerland demonstrates that Germans have superficial knowledge of the state of affairs 
in England and tend to overestimate it considerably. H. Gerland Die Einwirkung des Rich-
ters auf die Rechtsentwicklung in England, Leipzig–Berlin 1910.
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On the other hand, it has been wrongfully alleged that modernists 
consider it possible to adjudicate contra legem. Today, when the general 
lines of the new trend have already been drawn, this aspect has been 
set straight as well, while such revolutionary notions—which did previ-
ously exist—have been revised or withdrawn.24 It now becomes evident 
that that the proposed method of resolving matters was in fact praeter 
legem, not contra legem. It would also be unfounded to accuse modern-
ists of seeking to eliminate notions from the legal sciences, when actu-
ally the idea is to conceive notions which respond to the social needs as 
efficiently as possible. 
Thus far, I have discussed what occasioned the new trend, outlined 
its general nature and the crucial moments; I have also attempted to 
present its chief traits in the most objective manner possible. Now, let 
us assume a critical position, ask about the rationality and values of the 
new method with respect to the traditional approach. It should be noted, 
however, that I by no means pursue evaluation from the legal-politi-
cal viewpoint, or seek recognition of the necessity for the method to 
be universally introduced or categorically rejected. The matter remains 
closely related to the quality of human who is to deliver judgments in 
accordance with the new rules, to the maturity and impartiality of the ju-
dicial estate. Consequently, one set of solutions would perhaps be pref-
erable in the case of Russia, whereas different ones would apply in Ger-
many, Austria or France. Thorough knowledge of the territory should be 
acquired before any judgments are passed. 
Something else is the point here. Next to the legal-political perspec-
tive another viewpoint may be adopted, namely the new current may be 
examined from a legal-philosophical position, which focuses on the es-
sence and the tasks of law. As a result, we will perceive that in order to 
become a truly juridical current, the modernist trend must become more 
profound and undergo certain modifications since, though it harbours 
worthwhile elements, it has failed to formulate them in sufficient detail, 
24 Cf. H. Kantorowicz, Die Contra-legem Fabel, “Deutsche Richterzeitung“ 1911, no. 8.
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and goes too far in its critique of the traditional school. While preserving 
the teleological components, it is imperative that an objective element 
be introduced, so as to satisfy the requirement of legal security. 
Without becoming entangled in metaphysical speculations or ratio-
nalist deductions, and relying on the popular legal awareness instead, 
we may observe that crucial elements of law include not only the social-
state sanction, but also two other components, namely social purpose-
fulness and stability, and the determinacy of the normative regulations. 
The weakness of the traditional school lay in a certain oversight, 
in reducing the first of the aforesaid legal factors—social purpose—to 
an inferior rank. Logic predominated, the endeavour concentrated on 
the consistency and harmoniousness of the system, on subtle notional 
analysis. In consequence, actual social needs suffered twofold: firstly 
because the will of the legislator was constructed using abstract catego-
ries which were often unsuited to the specific actual circumstances but 
did the opposite, forcing life into the mould of a formula; secondly, be-
cause  the structure and the adjudication were founded on the presum-
able will of the legislator who was considerably remote from the current 
times and contemporary conditions, therefore the will could not be perti-
nent for the present-day relationships. Naturally, I disregard the attempts 
to construct the “presumable will of the legislator if they had known the 
conditions today”, as this is a contrived procedure resting on the sup-
position that the legislator would have acted “rationally”, whereby the 
latter notion is defined on the basis of one’s own views.  
The shortcoming of the modernist trend is that it depreciates the sec-
ond factor which is nevertheless quite relevant in law, namely the sta-
bility and objectivity of the formulated norms (which rectify statutory 
gaps). Modernism demands that the judge be released from the shackles 
of the statute, but it does not specify the direction which their actions 
should follow, and it does not provide objective directives one could use 
as guidance when resolving disputable issues. Admittedly, modernists 
do engage in deliberation on factors that need to be taken into account 
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when drafting laws, and suggest related guidelines. A considerable part 
of the brilliant work by Prof. Gény consists in enumerating and ana-
lyzing all those moments and circumstances which should play a role 
in establishing a legal norm. Undeniably, all possess certain degree of 
significance, but one should be aware that all are inherently subjective; 
even the findings of the social sciences on which Prof. Gény counts so 
much, once they cease to be theoretical and become practical knowledge 
(that is, when they no longer study what is but determine what should 
be), acquire subjective character. Liberal determination of the legal pur-
pose and the subjectivity of assessment are inseparable. 
A number of modernists believe that the objective aspect of created 
law is founded on the inquiry into the “nature of things”. “The nature 
of things, approached as a source of positive law, hangs upon the postu-
lation that relationships of social life harbour the capacity to keep them 
in balance and identify on their own, so to speak, the norm which should 
govern them.”25 This view is a reflection of the philosophical-sociolog-
ical theory developed in France and known by the name of solidarism. 
The view has been fairly often expressed in recent literature, but its chief 
flaw is that is presumes knowledge of the essence of a given phenom-
enon. “The nature of things” describes not only the entirety of actual cir-
cumstances relating to a particular area, but also denotes appreciation of 
their significance from the standpoint of values, and this latter element 
must necessarily be subjective. It cannot be denied that the study of the 
nature of things or nature of certain phenomena reduces subjectivity 
insofar as it generates the knowledge of all related facts, therefore value 
judgments rely on the same experimental material and their discrepancy 
thereby is diminished. However, the conclusion that knowledge of those 
factual circumstances could produce only one objective norm of action 
is untenable. In this position, subjectivity also remains indelible. 
25 F. Gény, Méthode d’interprétation et sources en droit privé positif: essai critique, Paris 
1899, p. 469.
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Other modernists are more radical in their approach. They do not 
provide any directives nor put forward any criteria. According to them, 
the judge should be given absolute, unconstrained freedom. Liberated 
from the fetter of logical constructs, they will find the most appropri-
ate norm on their own. “It is then that the ideal of impartiality (?) will 
be reified, since the partiality of the judge is due solely to the igno-
rance of social facts and views.”26 If the judge looks towards life itself 
as opposed to theory, they will gain the best possible grasp and sense of 
the vital social needs, determine the most purposeful norm, and find the 
most suitable law. 
However, can such a position be called a juridical one? Does it not 
contradict a vital quality of law, namely the stability of created norms? 
Is it not an acknowledgement of the unmitigated licence and subjectiv-
ity of the judge? Would it not lead to anarchy in the administration of 
justice? Modernists expect that taking social needs into account will 
result in the objectivity of adjudication. This is clearly a delusion which 
does not stand up to the text of experience. Even among profession-
als who devote themselves wholly to the study of the issue, life dem-
onstrates a tremendous disparity of views concerning social needs and 
the tasks of law, not to mention the situation of a layperson. One could 
go as far as to say: quot capita tot sensus. If the opinions on social 
policy in general are so diverse, then things become even more com-
plex when justice is administered, and not infrequently one can hard-
ly determine the social outcome of one or another ruling. Even if the 
views regarding social needs are concurrent in many points, how many 
of those—fundamental though they are at times—are disputed? In its 
extreme manifestations, the modernist trend enables judges (at least in 
principle) to deliver judgments which blatantly contradict the founda-
tions of the legal framework today (unless a statute stipulates expressly 
to the contrary), and negate the universal legal sense, only because it 
was deemed the most appropriate in the opinion of a given judge. The 
26 H. Kantorowicz, Die Contra-legem Fabel, “Deutsche Richterzeitung” 1911, no. 8, p. 46.
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position of the modernists cannot be reconciled with the principle of 
legal security. From the social standpoint, bad regulations are prefer-
able—as long as they are definite and stable—to the anarchic licence 
of judges. Absence of any guidelines and boundaries in adjudication 
constitutes a major deficit in the new programme. The usual response 
of the modernists, namely that the traditional method does not preclude 
subjectivity, does not suffice, as the extent and limits of subjectivity are 
the chief concern here. In the traditional school, subjectivity is evinced 
in a different comprehension of statutes, but the goal is to align rulings 
as closely as possible with statutory provisions, to the ratio legis, to the 
spirit of the law. In the new current, subjectivity results from disparate 
social views. In the former case, we are dealing with limited subjectiv-
ity; in the latter, it is unlimited.27
We are thus faced with the dilemma of two directions, either of which 
satisfies only one of the crucial elements of law. The first safeguards le-
gal security, the second assures social purpose. The question now arises 
of whether the above conflict is inevitable, whether one of those crucial 
elements has to be sacrificed. I believe that there is no such necessity, 
that the modernist trend should retain its merits of realistic-social orien-
tation, but that it requires some elaboration, some modification in order 
to achieve the quality it has been lacking: objectivity. Nonetheless, if we 
are to resolve that issue, we need to consider the actual source of all rul-
ings, the basis of all decisions: the psyche of the judge. 
If we attempt to analyze the psychology of the judge as it oper-
ates when passing judgments, we shall find three essential components 
corresponding to the three facets of our spiritual life: 1) the intellect 
(logical reasoning), 2) feeling, and 3) will. Each of these factors plays 
a certain role, and although one’s psychological being represents one in-
27 “The posited freedom in application of law would in reality engender—besides theoretical 
paralogism—a constant threat to the legal freedom of citizens, whose most fundamental 
pre-requisite is legal certainty and, in particular, the unassailable authority of the statute.” 
G. Del Vecchio, Sulla positivita come carattere del diritto, Prolusione al corso di Filosofia 
del diritto, Bologna 1911.
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divisible whole, in order to examine those psychological processes they 
need to be isolated by way of abstraction and their nature determined. 
The working of the intellect consists on the one hand in comparing 
the state of fact with the premises expressed in the statute and, on the 
other, in drawing consistent conclusions from statutory provisions. It is 
a process of reason par excellence, which operates using logical syllo-
gisms. This is also where the search for the legislative will takes place 
in those cases which are evidently not regulated. This is not a pursuit 
of the surmisable “rationality, purposefulness” of legislative will—as 
this is merely camouflaged subjectivity which introduces various ele-
ments into play, not only rational ones—but an act of drawing conclu-
sions by means of general principles, foundations deriving from the 
norms themselves, by means of the ratio legis inferred from a given 
statute. The orientation of this activity is the exact opposite of drawing 
direct conclusions from existing regulations. It is a process of logical 
construction which the traditional school held to be the only authori-
tative mode, an intellectual process devoid of any other elements. In 
practice, however, it seldom functions in its pure form, but tends to inte-
grate other psychological factors. 
Next to intellect, an element which contributes (consciously or un-
consciously) to legal decision-making is will. It is evinced in deliberat-
ing on the goal of a given adjudication or specific norm, whilst being 
aware of the social aftermath that a rule determined by the judge may 
cause and having the will to bring such outcomes about. Thus, if a judge, 
when resolving a contention between merchants, makes allowances for 
the impact that one decision or another will have on the development 
of trade (if it became a general norm), they demonstrate that they deem 
that development desirable from the standpoint of legal policy and have 
a “will” to support that particular social function. If, in a dispute be-
tween workers and their employer, the judge considers the needs of the 
national industry, the resulting decisions are again based on the mo-
ment of “will”. In principle, the traditional school negated the existence 
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of the element of “will” where judicial rulings were concerned, as it 
reduced everything to logical, rational factors, to examination of the 
“legislator’s will” irrespective of the consequences and subjective as-
sessments. However, things were different in practice, and total elimina-
tion of the purpose factor proves impossible in this domain. A principle 
to which one adheres in England states that the judge is not bound by 
a statute if it leads to absurd outcomes. The rule which thus applies there 
is “lex falsa lex non est”!28 The rule which in principle operates on 
the continent in “lex falsa lex est”, but in practice it is modified by vari-
ous devices, which is due to the effect of the factor of “will”.29
The third critical element involved in taking juridical decisions is 
the intuitive factor of legal sense. This consists in reflex-like, impulsive 
response to human actions from the legal standpoint, in perceiving them 
to be lawful or unlawful in accordance with the norms universally in 
force or not. There can be no doubt that the judge, in their appraisal of 
human actions behind the contentious issue, is subject to spontaneous 
emotional reaction which is largely unconscious, but which involun-
tarily induces them to rule in one way or another. Even such a positiv-
ist as Ihering, inclined as he is to account for everything by invoking 
conscious goals, acknowledges that “as a rule, the sense of rightness 
precedes knowing.”30 Legal sense has a paramount significance for 
the functioning of social life and the legal framework. One can hardly 
imagine the normal coexistence of people without that factor, for sus-
tained conformance with the law is by no means dependent on exact 
knowledge of its provisions—which is impossible—but consists in be-
ing guided by the legal sense inculcated by a given environment. Social 
28 E. K. Gerland, Die Einwirkung des Richters auf die Rechtsentwicklung in England, Berlin-
Leipzig 1910, p. 21.
29 From a strictly psychological position, will to adhere to the statute also comes prior to the 
intellectual function. However, I choose to stress that factor outside the boundaries adopted 
in the theory, since teleological considerations—objective criteria being absent—will ulti-
mately always depend on the element of will. 
30 R. von Ihering, Geist des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwick-
lung, Leipzig 1852, p. 353.
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education imparts a range of relevant impulses which inform the right 
way to conduct oneself. 
The combination of legal sense with actual conduct that consistently 
follows a particularly oriented pattern is at the root of the complex phe-
nomenon of customary law, which tends to be explained in such diverse 
ways. That optio necessitatis, which the authors of customary law often 
cite, relies in actual fact on opinis iuris; this is legal sense. Without this 
factor, the existence of customary law and its difference from custom 
cannot be explained. Also, it facilitates understanding of dispositive cus-
tomary law. 
I cannot go into the origins or the formation of legal sense. There 
is no doubt, however, that Ihering’s assertion: “nicht das Rechtsge-
fühl hat das Recht erzeugt, sondern das Recht das Rechtsgefühl“31 has 
no grounds in fact. Anthropologists and sociologists (Tylor, Maine, 
Dürkheim, Worms etc.) are in agreement that all societies, even those 
at the lowest level of development, have legal norms which are univer-
sally binding, few though they may be. We do not know and we cannot 
imagine a society without law. Now, given the fact that primitive law is 
a customary law which by default contains the element of legal sense, 
therefore there can be no temporal contrariety between law and legal 
sense, and the question of the emergence of the latter comes down to 
the question of the creation of law. Nevertheless, this last question can-
non be satisfactorily answered with the current state of knowledge, as 
the origins of the human and the first social groups are uncertain. Only 
detailed knowledge of human provenance and the formation of human 
society can enable productive, sociological inquiry into the genesis of 
law and legal sense. For us, the certainty that legal sense has existed in 
all societies and in all periods should suffice. 
This may be seen in various forms when justice is administered. For 
the most part, it arises unconsciously, in advance of the arguments of 
reason. As we know from history, the famed jurist Bartolus would first 
31 R. von Ihering, Der Zweck im Recht, Leipzig 1877, p. X.
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resolve an issue and then ask his friend Tigrinius to find relevant passag-
es in Corpus iuris as he “had poor memory”. Legal sense often evinces 
itself in the guise of “general legal principles”, “the nature of things”, 
“rightness” etc. The latter notion in particular tends to be identified with 
legal sense, though somewhat incorrectly, because “rightness” is a much 
more capacious term, since it relates not only to the procedure but many 
other manifestations of life (e.g. wrong reasoning, unwarranted wish) 
and generally denotes approval, the recognition of certain facts which 
may appertain to law, but may also be independent.32 Legal sense, on the 
other hand, is a psychological phenomenon, demonstrating specifically 
and exclusively in connection with law, and having a significant bearing 
on adjudication. 
Legal sense also plays a momentous role in the domain of legisla-
tion. From the psychological standpoint, the creation of laws is influ-
enced by two factors: considerations of purpose and legal sense. The 
legal sense of a period is especially revealed in its fullness in civil law 
statutes, which decisively affect the creation of binding norms. Certain 
authors33 recommend the enhancement of teleological factors by making 
civil policy a science which studies the legal means that can enable one 
to accomplish certain social goals, thus guiding the legislator. If such 
a branch of knowledge were to develop, it would reduce the role of legal 
sense but it would not eliminate it entirely, because considerations of 
purpose also needs to take that factor into account. The historical school 
embraced legal sense to a considerable extent, but comprehended it one-
sidedly, disposing completely of the teleological moments and lending it 
the mystical garb of “national spirit”; this elicited the positivist response 
which opted for the opposite extreme and began to ignore this factor. 
Legal sense has a creative dimension, but it can also be critical and 
destructive. In the political life of societies, one not infrequently sees how 
32 As aptly observed by Prof. Zoll who nonetheless approaches the matter differently. F. Zoll, 
Austriackie prawo prywatne. Część ogólna, Kraków 1909, p. 33.
33 L. Petrażycki, Die Lehre von Einkommen, Berlin 1885.
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this factor interacts with the applicable law. We often happen to hear that 
a statute is “unlawful” (e.g. expropriation in the Prussian partition), which 
does not mean anything other than a contradiction between a law and 
the existing legal sense of individuals or social groups. Where it gener-
ates tension, the conflict between the predominant legal sense and the law 
in force causes a violent reaction, a powerful outburst that culminates in 
the phenomenon of revolution. As the previous legal order is abolished, the 
factor of legal sense—previously critical and destructive—becomes cre-
ative, normative, and shows the right path to a new legal framework. One 
must not claim that this factor is the only one since teleological aspects 
also play an eminent role, but it is an inextricable element which com-
bines with other factors, either consciously or involuntarily. 
It is a matter of some wonder that a factor of such magnitude has 
thus far not received the scientific appreciation and scrutiny it is due. 
The existence of the very fact had already been stressed by Grotius, 
who speaks of law “ad quod a natura nostra nos duci sentimus”34, but 
deliberations of that kind have largely been approached by philosophers 
of law in a rational fashion, the most vivid example of which is Kant’s 
theory.35 Very often, the phenomenon was reduced to a manifestation of 
metaphysical being.36 To date, no one has embarked on a thorough in-
ductive-psychological study of the nature and reifications of legal sense 
as a real, empirical fact which played a tremendous role at the lower lev-
els of cultural development and still plays it today.37 One of the possible 
future sciences that could render invaluable services to jurisprudence 
34 H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Proleg. § 18.
35 “Alle sittliche Begriffe völlig a priori in der Vernunft Ihren Sitz und Ursprung haben; in die-
ser Reinigkeit ihrer Ursprunges eben ihre Würde liege”. I. Kant, Grundleg. zur Metaphysik 
der Sitten, 1785 Riga.
36 “L’origine e la natura delia coscienza del giusto é essentialmente un problema d‘ordine 
metafisico”. G. Del Vecchio, Il sentimento giuridico, Milan 1908, p. 12.
37 Precursory instances of such research may be found in the compelling works by Petrażycki 
though their critical part is more worthwhile than the positive one. L. Petrażycki, Wstęp do 
nauki prawa i moralności, 1907, L. Petrażycki, Teorya prawa i pańtwa, Saint Petersburg 1907.
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is legal psychology, which should remain closely associated with the 
sociology of law. 
It has become customary in contemporary science to classi-
fy legal sense among ethical phenomena, in the domain of morality. 
Petrażycki extensively elaborates on the view that intuitive law (which 
in Petrażycki’s writings denotes a phenomenon closely resembling that 
which we call legal sense) is identical with justice, that the two no-
tions overlap completely. Both phenomena represent normative psy-
chological experience, namely imperative-attributive emotions which 
incorporate the element of duty and the element of entitlement but are 
nonetheless independent from positive regulations. 38 This mingling of 
two notions which, though linked, are by no means identical, cannot be 
considered felicitous. Justice is a much broader notion that transcends 
the realm of law as it refers both to the religious sphere and phenom-
ena that are independent of human will (since injustice is a term we use 
to describe e.g. physical or intellectual inequality between people). On 
the other hand, justice displays an individualizing nature while law is 
universal; hence an act may be in keeping with the legal sense but go 
against the sense of justice (e.g. demanding payment of debt when the 
debtor is facing exceptionally adverse circumstances). Legal sense is 
a social-psychological phenomenon which arises on the grounds of law 
in the positive sense, therefore it should not become entangled in the 
domain of morality. Still, they should not be contrasted either, as both 
constitute two angles of approach to the analogous sphere of human 
phenomena and actions. Legal and moral sense could be envisioned as 
two overlapping circles which share a certain surface and have their 
separate parts as well. Although legal and moral sense are largely (but 
not always) in concordance, their distinct nature should be emphasized. 
Underlying both phenomena is a typically human psychological trait—
the awareness of the norms of conduct. One of the reasons why the no-
tions tend to be thus confused is language, the linguistic chaos caused 
38 L. Petrażycki, Teorya prawa i państwa, Saint Petersburg 1907, pp. 500–508.
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by the usage of the words “law”, “legal sense” and “moral sense”. How-
ever (as Petrażycki adroitly demonstrated), science is concerned with 
phenomena rather than with names, and linguistic custom is no major 
indication in the realm of universitas scientiarum. In the opinion of this 
author, legal sense constitutes a something which, sui generis, is a phe-
nomenon of juridical nature, regardless of whether individuals call it law 
or morality.
At this point, we should not delve ay deeper into the philosophical-
psychological issues. For the current purposes, it suffices to state the 
three psychological factors which accompany the exercise of the judi-
cial function: 1) intellect (logical adjustment to achieve alignment with 
statutes), 2) legal sense, and 3) will (teleological considerations, deter-
mination of social goals and legal means). 
If we now reconsider the tenets of legal modernism and the historical 
school, we will clearly see how both trends approach the psychological 
phenomena we have just discussed. The search for the legislative will, be 
it explicit or presumable, should proceed by way of reason while dismiss-
ing any other arguments. The creation of juridical science should only 
rely on the objective factor of intellect. Obviously, things were different in 
practice, but the theory recognized only rational operations, only logical 
constructions. The drawback of that method (in its pure form) is the nec-
essary rift between social needs and the “will of the legislator”, between 
the demands of the present day and the position adopted when a law was 
drafted. Here, law should be inflexible and obsolete. Furthermore, it is 
a one-sided position, as it does not allow for the remaining two factors 
which, as we have seen, actually play a momentous role.
Modernism gives precedence to feeling and will. Teleological as-
pects, the purposefulness of norms, is considered decisive, as law 
is merely a means for attaining certain social goals, and modern needs 
should be the sole criterion. Therefore, it emphasizes the necessity to 
democratize jurisprudence, to introduce harmony between public le-
gal awareness and the regulations in force, as it believes to be able to 
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achieve that end by leaving judges at complete liberty to rely on their 
feeling and will. It is a weakness of that trend that it does away with the 
intellectual element (as we understand it) altogether, relinquishes logi-
cal connection with the applicable statute, and thus utterly eliminates 
the objective factor. This leads to extreme subjectivity and latitude, and 
also precludes legal security. Apart from that, the position is also one-
sided because logical harmony and the link with the existing regulations 
must be retained if judicial rulings are not to be revolutionary in their 
nature (which the modernists by no means call for). 
As we can see, from the legal-philosophical standpoint as well as 
in the light of the essence of law, its principal postulations (social pur-
pose and objectivity of norms) display major shortcomings; the flaw of 
the first is that the norms are all too rigid (do not correspond to life), 
whereas the others are too subjective (liberal). The appropriate method 
should allow both for the vital demands of law and actual elements of 
human psychology which exert their impact in life; it should strive —as 
far as possible—to reconcile those two facets of legal phenomena. The 
task of the correct method would thus be to modernize the intellectual 
factor and render the factors of feeling and will more objective. 
First of all, let us see if that is feasible with respect to the most cru-
cial element of the modernist trend, that is the factor of will. Can there 
be guidelines, or lodestars that would objectively show the judge which 
relationships they should deem the most valuable and worthy of be-
ing endorsed by law? Are there or can there be pertinent criteria which 
harbour a universal value? Social good is an essential goal that tends 
to be very widely recognized as such. Yet, as we know, this is a term 
which speaks volumes but defines little, a flexible notion which can be 
construed in the most diverse ways. Quot capita, tot sensus. Virtually 
everyone who deliberates on those issues entertains different views with 
regard to legal means leading to the public good, to the benefit of all. In-
deed, there are theories that advance guiding rules which should govern 
the creation of law. However, should it be Stammler’s formula (Gemein-
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schaft frei wollender Menschen)? The fostering of altruistic impulses 
and the feeling of love (Petrażycki)? A legal rule based on the principle 
of solidarity (Duguit)? Or the development of culture of a given pe-
riod (Kohler, Berolzheimer)? Evaluation of particular institutions in the 
light of the course of development (Liszt, Makarewicz)? Undoubtedly, 
many of these factors on which the theories are founded should perhaps 
be taken into account. Still, I do not believe that any of the suggested di-
rectives can be deemed the one and only criterion. This is even more dif-
ficult given that the above theories apply to legislative policy rather than 
the objective we are concerned with—addressing statutory loopholes. 
Perhaps a science of civil-interpretative policy to advise judges, mod-
elled for instance on Petrażycki’s “civil policy”, will develop with time. 
There is also no doubt that accurate knowledge of social life and aware-
ness of the achievements of modern science reduces the difference in 
value assessments of the factual material. However, the factors of social 
purpose or will must remain more or less subjective, and this cannot 
be mitigated by even the subtlest philosophical constructs. Ultimately 
therefore, the refinement of the judge will be decisive, and that cannot 
be replaced by any guidelines or norms. 
If the factor of will (social purpose) cannot be made thoroughly objec-
tive, this does not mean that modernists are right in demanding complete 
freedom of the judge. Unqualified licence of the representatives of Themis 
cannot be admissible from the legal viewpoint. The total liberty of judges 
would result in the universal uncertainty of transactions, allegations of 
partiality, and severely undermined confidence of the public in the impar-
tial judiciary. If it is impossible to formulate objective, universally recog-
nized directives that would regulate the actions of judges, then one can 
and should define the boundaries of their discretional manifestations. One 
should delineate the confines, establish a framework within which law-
yers are at liberty to determine social purpose, but beyond which they can-
not go for reasons of public security. Such boundaries may be set by two 
other factors (intellect, feeling), as long as they are correctly construed. 
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As already noted, the intellectual factor consists in adjusting legal 
decisions to the existing laws. This consonance with the applicable regu-
lations (when addressing statutory lacunae) must be retained, although it 
should not mean the fictitious “will of the then legislator” but rather the 
actual “position of the contemporary legislator”. The issue here is not 
devising artificial constructs that serve to examine how the present-day 
legislator sees a given issue, as that would be impossible due to numer-
ous factors—exceedingly complex and unpredictable in themselves—
which affect the enactment of statutes. The matter should be approached 
in a juridical fashion, using pertinent methods of jurisprudence, so as to 
determine the position of the contemporary legislator in the light of the 
entirety of laws, including both codes and more recent acts of legisla-
tion. The idea here is to take heed of ratio iuris, or the legal principles 
and concepts which provide the point of departure, the foundation of 
statutory provisions. Since social views and legal principles evolve and 
change over time, the views and legislative principles which are closest 
to the present times should prevail; in other words, moderna ratio iuris 
decides. For this purpose, a new principle should be introduced along-
side the old tenet of lex posterior derogat priori: ratio iuris posterior 
derogat priori. For instance, if Napoleon’s code stipulates almost un-
limited freedom of contract, more recent statutes demonstrate a shift to-
wards protection of the economically disadvantaged classes, and when 
resolving a particular case, when formulating a legal norm, the latter po-
sition of moderna ratio iuris is decisive. Thus understood, the intellec-
tual factor is not contrary to the essential postulations of the modernists 
concerning due regard for the new social relationships, and at the same 
time has the great advantage of assuring legal security by establishing 
boundaries for judicial discretion. Most likely, analogous concepts are at 
the root of Paragraph 1 in the Swiss code which, in the event of statutory 
loopholes and the absence of pertinent customary law, entitles judges 
to rule according to a norm they would formulate as a legislator, whilst 
taking tradition into account. Here, logical compliance and consonance 
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with the essential foundations of the existing legal order are observed 
as well. 
The second psychological factor, which assumes various forms in 
the modernist postulations, is legal sense. It is found in all people, in all 
societies, but its manifestations tend to be very diverse. The legal re-
sponse to human action is by no means uniform, not only at various lev-
els of cultural development but even in the same civilizational period. 
Legal sense is a highly subjective moment and, in the form posited by 
modernists, it cannot be accepted as a principle of adjudication, as an 
objective norm. 
Let us briefly consider the essence and nature of legal sense, refer-
ring to our earlier observations in this respect. It is not only psychologi-
cal but also a social phenomenon, arising in equal measure from social 
education and life, and the idiosyncratic nature of a given individual. 
It would therefore follow that legal sense has two components: the indi-
vidual and the social one. Thus, we can speak of individual legal sense 
and social legal sense. 
The first phenomenon results from a whole plethora of factors, includ-
ing the influence of the social system and the general conditions in which 
members of a given social group happen to function, as well as a range of 
special circumstances affecting the individual, such as family upbringing, 
one’s milieu, the literature one has read, their views, temperament, life 
experiences and so on. The sum of all those factors makes up the psyche 
of the individual and the peculiar legal sense marked by their individual-
ity. This leads to differences of opinion and in the legal assessment of the 
same factual material, which are sometimes very profound. 
Still, human beings are social creatures and are therefore not alien to 
the trends that occur within society. Thus, their psychology is exposed 
to views, beliefs, and customs circulating in the community which, mir-
rored in their minds, leave indelible traces. From the earliest years, the 
entire upbringing of children consists in instilling such patterns of think-
ing, feeling, and acting which no doubt would not have developed spon-
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taneously; all efforts are aimed at making them social beings. Even the 
greatest individualists cannot divest themselves of the spiritual elements 
and impulses which have been inculcated by society. The very idea of 
individualism is a product of social life developed over time and which 
is unknown in the lowest tiers of civilization. As Comte very aptly put it: 
“L’homme se developpe collectivement et point individuellement.” The 
part of our “self” which is truly autonomous, truly independent from so-
ciety is so negligible that it plays a more serious role only in exceptional, 
outstanding personalities. What is more, a powerful manifestation of 
individualism which is at odds with social notions usually provokes an 
intense public response, and it is not unusual for the pioneers of novel 
ideas to become their martyrs. The presence of social-psychological 
phenomena which occur in the entire society and, in a sense, beyond 
individuals themselves, is so evident that it became the foundation of 
a whole sociological school (Durkheim, Bouglé, etc.), which neverthe-
less goes too far in presuming that these phenomena constitute external 
compulsion and exist separately and independently of the individual 
psyche.39 Among the various social-psychological phenomena, social 
legal sense takes one of the foremost places. It represents the outcome 
of the entire legal system within which each citizen lives and develops, 
the upshot of all conditions created by statutory and customary law, of 
the whole configuration of social life. It may differ from period to period 
and from peoples to peoples, but in a given society it remains uniform 
for all, or at least for the majority of its members. The most eloquent rei-
fication of the social legal sense is customary law, whose pre-requisite is 
the conviction of lawfulness shared not by particular individuals but by 
the entire community (or specific groups). While customary law cannot 
exist without social legal sense, the reverse is not out of the question. 
It is possible for a specifically oriented social legal sense to exist without 
being actually exercised (e.g. due to statutory obstacles). 
39 E. Durkheim, Les regles de la methode sociologique, Paris 1910, p. 19ff.
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Social legal sense is not independent of the individual psyche. It only 
means a certain set of psychological elements that are common to the 
entirety of a given social group. Thus, an individual legal sense is nar-
rower with regard to the subject, being attached to one person only, but 
it is broader in terms of its object, because it comprises social legal sense 
as well as particular traits of the individual. It may be conjectured that in 
the legal sense of an average citizen social elements outweigh individual 
ones, which is due to the nature of the phenomenon as it tends to create 
norms imposed coercively on everyone and therefore induces adjust-
ment of one’s singular legal sense so that it conforms with the views of 
the whole social body. 
It follows from the above that the psyche of the judge (or theoreti-
cal jurist) contains legal sense made up of two elements. The question 
then is which of those elements proves decisive in the administration 
of justice: the personal or the popular, the individual or the social one? 
This, surely, is no major quandary. Judges do not approach jurispru-
dence from the standpoint of the peculiar emotional traits of particular 
individuals, but as exponents of the common views and social senti-
ment. In the administration of justice, social legal sense is the only one 
which can be taken into account. Thus the factor of feeling, which al-
ready plays a serious role today, becomes an objective factor and estab-
lishes the limits of discretion for the actions of the judge. The postula-
tion of the modernists concerning integration of the judge’s legal sense 
into the process should be thus modified in order to become a genuinely 
objective directive and a boundary in adjudication. This is no radical re-
form but a refinement of the process which is already taking place. Here, 
one can also refer to Paragraph 1 of the Swiss code, which sets forth that 
in the case of statutory loopholes the judge shall take customary law 
into account. If we extend that last notion and exclude the requirement 
of sustained actual application, we arrive at social legal sense. Undoubt-
edly, conclusive determination of that condition is severely hindered. 
It obliges the judge to step outside their office and look into social life so 
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as to gain insight into its currents. Nevertheless, as a general guideline 
it is an inevitable consequence of the modernist postulation to make law 
more social. Perhaps the evolution of the judiciary will lead to greater 
specialization and produce professionals who are conversant with cer-
tain areas of social life and related needs. After all, effective application 
of the above factor—as well as others—ultimately hinges on judges’ 
knowledge and their tact. 
Thus we arrive at the general conclusion of our disquisition: if con-
temporary social needs are to be duly considered in jurisprudence and the 
administration of justice, the judge must necessarily be at liberty to make 
their assessments, which must be more or less subjective. However, for 
reasons of legal security, certain boundaries to subjective assessments 
must be introduced, and these will be supplied by two other factors: 1) 
the intellectual factor (alignment with the existing legal order), and 2) the 
factor of feeling (social legal sense). If determination of the social pur-
pose or needs is problematic in a given case, the above factors offer direc-
tives which facilitate the task of the judge. However, if the assessment of 
the judge is definite but too individually or subjectively tinged, the above 
factors ensure the boundaries within which autonomous discretion is not 
suppressed, but which should not be overstepped. These are safety con-
straints, put in place in the interest of the stability of the legal order.
We shall therefore formulate our position in the following manner: 
In situations for which the statute does not provide, the judge should 
freely determine the norm which will be the most appropriate in view of 
social needs, taking into consideration the position of the contemporary 
legislator (moderna ratio iuris) and the social legal sense. 
Finally, I would like to touch upon an issue which thus far has not 
been discussed with respect to the development of the modern trend, 
but remains closely associated, and even arises from it by way of con-
sequence. We have said that making legal decisions should involve so-
cial legal sense. Obviously, this means the legal sense of the social group 
where a given contention takes place. Thus, in issues relating to industrial 
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labour one cannot seek legal sense among farmers, nor rely on the con-
viction of tradesmen in agricultural disputes. However, there is a social 
group whose significance in terms of legal sense is superior: this group 
is the nation itself, and the national legal sense is the respective phenom-
enon. It is not the mystical “Volksgeist” of the historical school, their 
alleged sole factor behind the creation of law, but a distinct manner of 
understanding, feeling and responding to the phenomena of the external 
world. There are various views relating to the issue of nationality, and 
the definitions are just as diverse. However, as the phenomenon evolves 
and the thoroughness of dedicated studies increases, it becomes more and 
more evident that the essence of nationality in the contemporary sense 
should be sought in the sphere of psychology. The opinion expressed by 
Renan40, who states that “Une nation est une âme, un principe spirituel”, 
aptly captures the pivotal moment of that phenomenon. Specific history, 
different customs, views and beliefs yield a distinct national psyche. Each 
nation has its peculiar fashion of comprehending things and a dissimilar 
normative sensibility; each has its national psyche. Bearing in mind that 
legal sense is a component of the general psychological make-up, each 
nation possesses a singular national legal sense, which also needs to be 
contemplated when laws are applied. The existence of that factor becomes 
even less doubtful when we observe that nations today are a result of joint 
living in the community of state41 and thus in a common legal framework, 
therefore they must harbour that psychological element which is directly 
associated with the legal organization: national legal sense. The phenom-
enon should not be approached as an isolated occurrence, since it is linked 
to all other currents and manifestations of the national spirit, and consti-
tutes an inseparable ingredient in the national culture as a whole.42
40 E. Renan, Qu’est ce que’une nation, Paris 1882, p. 26.
41 “Eine Vielheit von Menschen, die durch eine Vielheit gemeinsamer, eigentümlicher Kul-
turelemente und eine gemeinsame geschichtliche Vergangenheit sich geeinigt und dadurch 
von anderen unterschieden weiss, bildet eine Nation”, G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 
Berlin, 1905, p. 114.
42 “Plusieurs choses gouvernent les hommes : le climat, la religion, les lois, les maximes du 
gouvernement, les exemples des choses passees, les moeurs, les manieres; d’ou il se forme 
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Under normal conditions, where the state overlaps with the nation, 
the distinctiveness of the national legal sense does not cause any com-
plications. It is expressed in the legislation, which corresponds with the 
character of a given nation. States which represent a conglomerate of 
many nationalities are a different matter. The difficulties seen there owe 
to the differences between those nationalities, and there is the additional 
danger of the ruling group forcibly imposing their qualities on all other 
national groups. “There are two kinds of tyranny,” says Montesquieu, 
“one real, which arises from oppression; the other is seated in opinion, 
and is sure to be felt whenever those who govern establish things shock-
ing to the present ideas of a nation.”43 Incidentally, this is not merely 
a theoretical possibility but a very real phenomenon which is seen in 
Europe ever more clearly.44
The modernist current fails to mention these difficulties, passes 
over them in silence, and that gap needs to be rectified. Legal differ-
ences must be taken into account if the law is to be genuinely “so-
cialized”, if there is to be harmony between regulations and the legal 
awareness of the broad public. Quite rightly, modernism places con-
cern for social needs at the fore, but there can be no doubt that one of 
the most striking social needs is recognition of the national traits by 
adjusting the law so that it dovetails with the psychology of a nation. 
This is why the modernist trend requires necessary modification along 
those very lines. The free reckoning on a judge’s part should rely on 
detailed knowledge of views, feelings, customs and beliefs—all the 
qualities of a given nation—while legal norms should be formulated 
accordingly. Most likely, the efforts to rectify lacunae and contradic-
tions in the statutes do not satisfy such bias sufficiently. It is also likely 
that the overall evolution of law will lead to the adoption of the princi-
un esprit général qui en resulte.” C.L. Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, Londres 1777, XIX, 4.
43 C. L. Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, Londres 1777, XIX, 3.
44 Simon Rundstein makes some interesting remarks on that score in Freie Rechtsfindung und 
Differenzierung des Rechtsbewusstseins. S. Rundstein, Freie Rechtsfindung und Differen-
zierung des Rechtsbewusstseins, ”Archiv für bürgerliches Recht” vol. XXXIV.
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ple argued by the modernists, namely that statutes should only contain 
general guidelines which the judge will follow as particular conditions 
and circumstances allow. In such a case, national differences could be 
taken into account to a much broader extent. At any rate, the modern-
ist trend requires supplementation with regard to the national aspect. 
Next to the motto affirming the “socialization of law!”, another prin-
ciple should be posited: the “nationalization of law!”
Of all the stateless nations, the strongest awareness of national dis-
tinctiveness has been preserved among Poles. Hence one could assert 
a priori that the Polish legal sense is characterized by exceptional poten-
cy. It is true that the long-lasting abnormal political state has to some de-
gree undermined the cohesion of the national psyche and disturbed the 
Polish legal sense. Nonetheless, the distinctiveness endures and tends 
to be very vividly evinced in some regions. However, the phenomenon 
has not been systematically studied, and the yield of Polish science dis-
plays major deficits in that respect. Inquiry into the nature and mani-
festations of Polish legal sense in the light of our historical past and in 
connection with the entirety of our national culture should be one of the 
chief tasks of Polish jurisprudence. Only thorough knowledge of one’s 
society can enable the application of law that is attuned to its needs and 
national qualities. 
With respect to the modernist trend, which is now transitioning into 
a Europe-wide current, Poland should not be passive and merely re-
ceptive but contribute its own postulation, a novel factor, namely the 
nationalization of law. 
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